Turnout: 83.92%
About this election
Turkey held a general election for the 550-seat Grand National Assembly on 7 June 2015. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) won 40.87% and 258 seats — its worst result since coming to power in 2002 and, crucially, short of the 276 seats needed to govern alone. The Republican People's Party (CHP) took 24.95% and 132 seats, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 16.29% and 80, and the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) made history by clearing the 10% national threshold with 13.12%, winning 80 seats. It was the first hung parliament since 1999. Turnout was 83.92%.
At the time Turkey was a parliamentary republic. The Grand National Assembly, elected for a four-year term, chose and could dismiss the government, and the prime minister was the head of the executive while the president — directly elected since 2014 — was nominally above party politics. That balance was already under strain: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the AKP's founder, openly campaigned for his former party and made clear he wanted a constitutional change to an executive presidency, which the 2015 result was widely seen as a referendum on.
Members were elected by proportional representation (D'Hondt) in multi-member provincial constituencies, subject to a 10% national threshold — one of the highest in the world, designed in the aftermath of the 1980 coup to keep small and especially Kurdish parties out of parliament. A party falling below 10% won no seats at all, its votes redistributed to those above the line, which historically inflated the AKP's seat bonus. The HDP's decision to run as a party rather than as independents, and its success in crossing the threshold, was the decisive gamble of the election.
After thirteen years of single-party AKP rule, the campaign turned on Erdoğan's push for a presidential system, a slowing economy, and the breakdown of the peace process with the Kurdish PKK. The HDP, led by the charismatic Selahattin Demirtaş, broadened its appeal beyond Kurdish nationalists to liberals and the left with the slogan "We won't make you president", directly targeting Erdoğan's ambitions.
The AKP (Ahmet Davutoğlu was prime minister) remained dominant but diminished; the secularist, centre-left CHP was the main opposition; the far-right MHP held the nationalist vote; and the HDP emerged as a genuine fourth force by crossing the threshold for the first time.
Stripped of its majority, the AKP needed a coalition partner for the first time, but talks with the CHP and the MHP dragged on through the summer without agreement. Erdoğan, with little appetite for a coalition that would block his presidential project, allowed the 45-day constitutional deadline to lapse, triggering a fresh election in November. The interim was overshadowed by a collapse of the Kurdish peace process and a wave of violence.
Between the two 2015 elections Turkey's security situation deteriorated sharply: a suicide bombing in Suruç in July killed 33 pro-Kurdish activists, the PKK ceasefire collapsed and fighting resumed in the south-east, and in October a double suicide bombing at a peace rally in Ankara killed over 100 people — the deadliest terrorist attack in modern Turkish history. The climate of fear and instability would shape the November re-run.
Compared with 2011, when the AKP had won nearly 50%, the June 2015 result represented a significant erosion of its dominance and appeared to halt Erdoğan's presidential drive — a check that proved only temporary once the election was re-run five months later.
The night's defining achievement belonged to the HDP. By choosing to contest the election as a unified party rather than fielding independents — the traditional Kurdish tactic for evading the 10% threshold — it took an enormous risk: falling even slightly short would have handed almost all its seats to the AKP. Instead it won over 13% and 80 seats, drawing not only on its Kurdish base in the south-east but on liberal, leftist and secular voters in the western cities who wanted to deny Erdoğan a supermajority. Its 80-strong delegation, including a record number of women and the first openly gay candidate to stand for the Turkish parliament, was the single biggest reason the AKP lost its majority.
Beneath the constitutional drama lay growing economic anxiety. After years of rapid growth, the Turkish lira had weakened, foreign investment was slowing, and youth unemployment was rising. The AKP campaigned on its record of infrastructure and rising living standards, but the opposition parties argued that the model was running out of steam and that the concentration of power Erdoğan sought would deter the investment the country needed.
Turnout of 83.92% was high by international standards, reflecting Turkey's strong tradition of electoral participation and the unusually high stakes of a contest framed as a verdict on Erdoğan's plans to remake the constitution.
Supreme Election Council of Turkey (YSK) — ysk.gov.tr.
Compiled and reviewed by Bartłomiej Paruzel, Election Data Analyst, from official results. See our data methodology.